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Deepening financial development and rapid economic growth in China have been 
accompanied by widening income disparity between the coastal and inland regions. In 
this paper, by employing panel dataset for 29 Chinese provinces over the period of 
1990-2001 and applying the generalized method of moment (GMM) techniques, we 
examine the impacts of financial development on China’s growth performance. Our 
empirical results show that financial development significantly promotes economic 
growth in coastal regions but not in the inland regions; the weak finance-growth nexus 
in inland provinces may aggravate China’s regional disparities. 
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1 Introduction 
The increasing regional income disparity in China has recently attracted a lot of 
attention. China’s open door policy and economic reforms since 1978 have led not only 
to rapid economic growth, but also worsening income distribution. First of all, 
preferential government policy and the concentration of trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the coastal areas have significantly promoted economic growth in 
these regions, but largely left the poor inland regions behind. The coast-interior 
dichotomy and the widening regional income disparity have posed serious challenges 
for China’s future development. 
Different factors have been forwarded to explain China’s regional disparity. Tsui (1991) 
examines the effect of China’s fiscal decentralization on regional disparity, and finds a 
positive relationship between decentralization and worsening regional disparity before 
1985. Lee (1994) investigates the relationship between FDI and regional development 
gap, and concludes that the difference in the amount of FDI contributes to China’s 
regional disparity. Similar results can also be found in the analysis of Dayal-Gulati and 
Husain (2000). Young (2000) considers the role of local protectionism in explaining 
China’s regional disparity. He presents a lot of evidence on the rise of local protectionism 
in China during the reform era, and argues that this may widen the income gap among 
Chinese regions. For some authors, geographical factors and regional preferential policies 
are considered as the main cause of the economic boom in the coastal regions (e.g., 
Fleisher and Chen 1997; Démurger et al. 2001). Démurger et al. (2001) find positive 
‘pure geographical effects’ and positive ‘preferential-policy effects’ for coastal provinces, 
and they propose that rapid growth of the coastal provinces in the post-1978 period did 
not occur too much at the expense of the interior areas.1 In a recent study, Zhang and Fan 
(2004) examine the contributions of various types of public investments to regional 
inequality in rural China. They find that all types of investments in the least-developed 
western regions reduce regional inequality, whereas additional investments in the coastal 
and central regions tend to worsen regional inequality; in addition, investments in rural 
education and agricultural R&D in the western regions have the largest and most 
favourable impacts on narrowing regional disparity. 
Despite a large literature on the cause and consequence of coast-interior development 
gap in China, only a few attempts have been made to address the role of financial 
development in the dynamic evolution of China’s regional disparity. Using more recent 
and systemic data on China’s financial market and financial intermediation, this paper 
attempts to add to the existing literature by providing new evidence on the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth from a coast-interior perspective, 
and thus contributes to the current debate on China’s regional disparity. 
                                                 
1  This argument is in contrast to the results of some other research, for example, Zhao (1994) argues 
that the greater concentration of China’s overall investment to the coastal provinces contributes 
significantly to the economic boom of these regions, partially at the expense of the interior areas. 6 
According to the literature, both theoretical and empirical studies suggest a positive 
relationship between finance and growth, and that the development of financial markets 
and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process (Levine 1997). 
However, a bi-directional causality between finance and growth, in which financial 
development and growth are both endogenously determined, has also been proposed in 
recent empirical works. Given the endogenous nature of these variables, instrumental 
approaches or more advanced econometric techniques (e.g., the instrumental-variable 
estimator, and the generalized method of moment-GMM approach) are used in the 
empirical literature to control for endogeneity arising either from reverse causation or 
from dynamic specification. In this paper, the GMM approach is employed to control 
for endogeneity in our regression model. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief literature 
review on the relationship between finance and growth. Section 3 highlights recent 
trend of regional disparity and financial development in China. Variables and data for 
regression are described in section 4. Empirical analyses are presented in section 5. 
Using panel data for 29 Chinese provinces over the period of 1990-2001 and applying 
the GMM techniques, we investigate the impacts of financial development on the 
pattern of regional economic growth in China. Finally, this paper concludes with 
section 6. 
2  Financial development and economic growth: a brief literature review 
The important role of financial sector in the process of economic development has long 
been recognized in the literature (e.g., McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973; Greenwood and 
Jovanovic 1990; Bencivenga and Smith 1991; King and Levine1993a, 1993b; Merton 
and Bodie 1995; Levine 1997). A well-functioning financial system will stimulate 
economic growth by providing a number of important functions such as clearing and 
settling of payments, pooling of savings, facilitating the allocation of resources across 
space and time, pooling risk, and reducing information costs (Merton and Bodie 1995). 
The significant contribution of financial intermediaries in promoting economic growth 
has been highlighted in recent endogenous growth literature. Through financial 
intermediations, financial development can lead to an increase in the long-run growth 
rate. Therefore, within the framework of endogenous growth, financial development can 
have not only level effects, but also growth effects. 
Meanwhile, a number of new insights can be drawn from the recent advance in 
theoretical works, where various functions of financial intermediaries are stressed. For 
instance, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) develop an endogenous model, in which 
finance and growth are jointly determined. They highlight two essential functions of 
financial intermediaries in promoting growth, i.e., collecting and analysing information 
of alternatives investment projects, and increasing investment efficiency through 
allocating the funds to the projects with higher expected returns. Alternatively, in the 7 
endogenous model of Bencivenga and Smith (1991), they focus on another key function 
of financial intermediation for the development process. They argue that by enhancing 
liquidity and mitigating idiosyncratic risk through risk diversification and pooling, the 
development of financial intermediaries results in a reduction of households’ 
unproductive reserve of liquid assets, as such funds can be channelled toward illiquid 
but more productive activities, and therefore financial intermediary development highly 
contributes to economic growth. Moreover, the importance of portfolio diversification 
and risking sharing via stock markets in inducing sustained growth is also explored in a 
number of studies (e.g., Levine 1991; Saint-Paul 1992). All these works provide strong 
evidence to suggest that financial development can affect long-run growth through 
different channels and various aspects of innovation or productive activities. 
Public policies can also affect financial development in many ways. Roubini and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995) are among the few works that incorporate government 
behaviour and financial development into endogenous growth model. In their recent 
paper (1995), an AK-type endogenous growth model is set up to examine the effects of 
financial repression policies on long-term growth. They argue that government might 
want to repress the financial sector because this sector is an ‘easy’ source for financing 
the public budget. In order to increase the revenue from money creation, governments 
subject to large income-tax evasion may choose to increase seigniorage by repressing 
the financial sector and increasing inflation rates. Financial repression will therefore be 
associated with high tax evasion, low growth, and high inflation. 
The positive relationship between finance and growth predicted by the endogenous 
growth literature has received considerable support from a number of empirical studies. 
Using data on 80 countries over the period of 1960-89, King and Levine (1993a) 
empirically investigate the finance-growth linkage. They find that higher levels of 
financial development are positively associated with faster current and future rates of 
economic growth, physical capital accumulation, and economic efficiency 
improvement. Based on more recent data for 63 countries over the period of 1960-95, 
Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) find that higher levels of financial intermediary 
development produce faster rates of economic growth and total factor productivity 
growth. Similar results can also been found in Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000). 
Therefore, these empirical studies suggest a positive, first-order relationship between 
financial development and economic growth.  
However, this conventional view has also been challenged by some recent empirical 
studies. Demetriades and Hussein (1996) highlight the dangers of statistical inference in 
cross-section studies on finance-growth nexus in which countries with very different 
experiences in both economic growth and financial development, reflecting different 
institutional characteristics and different policies, are implicitly treated as homogeneous 
entities. Using time-series data from 16 countries, their causality tests provide little 
support to the view that finance is a leading sector in the process of economic 
development. They find that the patterns and directions of causality between finance 
and growth vary across countries. Based on a broad dataset covering 95 countries, Ram 8 
(1999) finds that the predominant pattern indicates a negligible or weakly negative 
association between financial development and economic growth. In addition, when the 
data sample is split into three subgroups according to growth experience (i.e., low-
growth, medium-growth, and high-growth countries), a huge parametric heterogeneity is 
observed, showing a negligible or negative finance-growth relationship. Andersen and 
Tarp (2003) also investigate the finance-growth nexus by using data identical to that of 
Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), estimating with both the full sample and the regional 
sub-samples. They find that while a positive and significant relationship is found in the 
full sample cross-section studies, the correlation is negative in the poorest countries; 
meanwhile, in individual-country studies, different causal patterns between finance and 
growth are reported; moreover, conclusions are very sensitive to the type of estimator 
used, and slight changes in nuisance parameters often change the results. 
Therefore, empirical findings of existing studies on the finance-growth nexus are mixed. 
Moreover, while a number of studies have been conducted to investigate the finance-
growth linkage through cross-country regressions, detailed empirical research in a 
country- and region-specific context is required to provide deeper insights into this 
critical nexus. In this paper, with the help of the recently released Chinese provincial 
data, we attempt to investigate the impacts of regional financial development on the 
patterns of regional economic growth, so as to better understand to what extent the 
differences in the degree of financial development across Chinese provinces can 
account for the increasing regional income disparity in the country.  
3  China’s financial development and regional growth performance 
3.1  Development of financial markets and financial intermediaries 
Over the last two decades, substantial change has occurred in China’s financial sector, 
e.g., institutional reforms and financial innovations in the banking system, and rapid 
development in China’s emerging capital market. 
The abandonment of the mono-banking system in the late 1970s marked the beginning 
of China’s financial reforms. Four state-owned specialized banks, authorized with 
specialized functions concerning different scopes of economic activities, were separated 
from the traditional financial system, and the People’s Bank of China (PBC) was 
reorganized as the central bank of China.2 Since then, various financial institutions have 
been successively set up, and China’s financial system has been gradually transformed 
from a mono-banking system into a diversified financial institutional system. 
                                                 
2  These four state-owned specialized banks are: the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the China 
Construction Bank (CCB), the Bank of China (BOC) and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC).  9 
The promulgation of the Central Bank Law and the Commercial Bank Law in 1995 
further deepened the country’s financial reforms. The Central Bank Law endorsed the 
independent status of the PBC, so that the PBC is ‘free from intervention by local 
governments, public organizations, individuals, or other administrative organs at all 
levels’. Similarly, the Commercial Bank Law ensures and protects the independent 
operations of commercial banks, and explicitly separates the commercial banking from 
the securities business and investment banking. Therefore, both the Commercial Bank 
Law and the Central Bank Law lay the foundation of a modern banking system in 
China.  
Table 1 reports the ratio of loans and deposits in China’s financial institutions to GDP, 
and that of money and quasi-money (M2) to GDP. Both are important indicators to 
measure the development level of the financial sector. We find that the scale of loans 
and deposits in China’s financial institutions grew rapidly over the last decade. The 
deposits-to-GDP ratio amounted to 1.63 in 2002, a sharp increase of 116 per cent from 
1990; the loans-to-GDP ratio rose from 0.95 to 1.25 during the same period. The M2-to-
GDP ratio also experienced a remarkable increase, amounting to 1.77 in 2002, which 
was more than double the figure twelve years ago. 
However, the large scale of non-performing loans in China’s banking sector impedes 
further development of financial intermediation. Heavy burden of ‘policy lending’, poor 
banking operations and management, soft budget constraints due to insider control and 
government intervention, and the lack of efficient regulation and surveillance system 
have long been recognized as the main causes of the country’s accumulation of non-
performing loans.  
To solve the problem of non-performing loans, the central government had injected a 
total of 270 billion yuan (US$32.6 billion) into the four major state-owned banks in 
1998. In addition, four asset management corporations (AMCs) were established in 
1999 to relieve the heavy burden on four major state banks by taking over 1.4 trillion 
yuan (US$169) of their non-performing loans and bad debts. However, due to the lack 
of appropriate mechanism in transformation and institutional reforms in financial 
systems, the effects of these policy measures are quite limited. By the end of 2003, the 
total amount of non-performing loans in the four major state-owned banks has reached 
nearly 2 trillion yuan (US$242 billion), equivalent to 20 per cent of their total assets. 
Table 1 
Ratio of money and quasi-money (M2), deposits and loans in financial institutions to GDP, 1990-2002 
(%)  1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Deposits/GDP 0.76  0.92  1.014  1.11 1.22 1.33 1.38 1.48 1.63 
Loans/GDP  0.95 0.86 0.90 1.01 1.10 1.14 1.11 1.15 1.25 
M2/GDP  0.82 1.04 1.12 1.22 1.33 1.46 1.50 1.63 1.77 
Source: NBS  (various  years). 10 
With China’s accession into the WTO in 2001, further penetration of foreign banks and 
increasingly intensive competition are expected. Under China’s commitment to the 
WTO, its banking sector will be fully open to foreign competition by 2006. To speed up 
China’s financial reform process and to advance banking restructuring, the Chinese 
authorities have recently instigated a series of policy measures to reduce non-
performing loans, improve the efficiency of financial sector, strengthen banks’ 
corporate governance, and enhance their competitiveness. 
In December 2003, the Chinese government injected US$45 billion of its foreign 
reserve into the Bank of China (BOC) and the China Construction Bank (CCB), so as to 
increase the adequacy of bank reserve and strengthen banks’ capital base in preparation 
for their restructuring into joint-stock commercial banks and stock market public listing. 
Meanwhile, the Central Huijin Investment Company was set up in 2003 to manage these 
injected funds and supervise the banking reforms of the BOC and the CCB, in an 
attempt to turn these two state-owned banks into competitive and modern commercial 
banks. In the near future, the other two state-owned institutions, i.e., the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), are also 
expected to be re-capitalized; in addition, the joint-stock system reforms of these two 
banks have been put on the agenda. 
The past ten years have witnessed significant development in the country’s emerging 
capital market. Since the opening of Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange in the early 1990s, China’s stock market has substantially expanded. The 
Securities Law in 1999 provided the legal basis as well as detailed regulations for 
regulating investors and listed companies. Since then, the stock market has played an 
increasingly important role in the economy by facilitating capital raising, promoting 
domestic investment, and improving efficiency of financial resource allocation.  
Table 2 reports the ratio of China’s total stock market capitalization (TMC) and 
negotiable stock market capitalization (NMC) to GDP. The TMC-to-GDP ratio rose 
from a mere 8 per cent in 1994 to more than 45 per cent in 2001; NMC-to-GDP ratio 
also expanded impressively from 2 per cent to 15 per cent in the same period. This 
suggests a remarkable increase in the importance of stock markets in the Chinese 
economy. Table 2 also presents the ratio of domestically raised capital to total fixed 
assets investment, which registered an increase from 0.59 per cent to 3.18 per cent 
during this period. Furthermore, rapid development in the bonds market, money market, 
foreign exchange market and other aspects of the financial sector have greatly 
contributed to China’s economic growth. 
However, a number of recent studies find that with profit rates and returns to capital 
differing widely across regions, the integrated level of China’s internal financial market 
is low (e.g., World Bank 2003; Tan and Zhang 2004; Boyreau-Debray and Wei 2004). 
Due to the fragmentation of the financial market, the development level of local 
financial intermediaries has been an important factor in determining local economic 
performance (Boyreau-Debray 2003). Continuing commercialization of the banking 11 
sector and further deepening financial reforms are required to improve China’s domestic 
financial market integration and flexibility. 
Table 2 
Ratio of market capitalization to GDP and of domestically raised capital to investment in fixed assets:  


































































































































































































1994 3,690.62  7.89  964.82  2.06 99.78 17,042.1  0.59 
1995 3,474.0  5.94  937.94  1.6 85.51 20,019.3  0.43 
1996 9,842.37  14.5  2,867.03  4.22 294.34  22,913.5 1.28 
1997 17,529.23  23.44  5,204.43 6.96  856.06 24,941.1  3.43 
1998 19,505.64  24.52  5,745.59 7.22  778.02 28,406.2  2.74 
1999 26,471.17  32.26  8,213.97 10.01  896.83 29,475.2  3.04 
2000 48,090.94  53.79  16,087.52 17.99  1,540.86 32,917.7  4.68 
2001 43,522.19  45.37  14,463.16 15.08  1,182.15 37,213.5  3.18 
Source:   CSSB (2002). 
3.2  Regional disparity in China 
After more than two decades of market-oriented reforms, the rapid developments of 
China, especially its great achievements in stimulating economic growth, have been 
widely acknowledged and well documented. However, rapid economic growth has been 
accompanied by a remarkable increase in regional income disparity.  
Interregional inequality in China has long been considered as a major factor 
contributing to the aggregate inequality. Regional income disparity, measured by Gini 
coefficient of provincial GDP per capita in 1978 constant price, rose rapidly throughout 
the 1990s, amounting to 0.387 in 2002, up from 0.329 in 1990. Figure 1 gives the 
changes in regional disparity in China over the last decade.  
The widening regional disparity has presented a serious challenge to the Chinese 
government. Increasing concerns of social equity and social stability have also led the 
authorities to exert greater efforts to fight income disparity. In order to accelerate the 
economic development of the inland provinces and to lower interregional income 
disparity, the central government has formulated comprehensive development strategies 
and policy measures. In 1996, the Chinese government presented its ninth five-year 
plan, in which rectifying the regional income gap was formally placed on the agenda. 
By the end of the 1990s, the central government began to implement the strategy for the 
development of the western regions. According to the Report on the Work of the Central 
Government presented at the third session of the ninth National People’s Congress in 
March 2000, three main goals for the development of the western regions had been well 12 
established, i.e., narrowing regional disparities in economic development and income 
distribution; maintaining social and political stability in the western areas by 
accelerating development in these regions; and creating new economic growth by 
expanding domestic demand to respond to the slowing economic growth in China.3 The 
implementation of these strategies and policies is generally based on the comparative 
advantage of the western regions, and will certainly contribute to accelerate its 
economic growth and narrow the divergence between the coastal and inland regions. 
Figure 1 












1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Regional income disparity
 
Note:   Regional income disparity is measured by the Gini coefficient of provincial real GDP per capita. 
Source:   NBS (various issues). 
4  Variables, model and data 
4.1  Variables definitions and measurements 
In our empirical estimations on the relationship between finance and growth, the 
logarithm of real GDP per capita in 1978 constant price (Y) is employed as the 
dependent variable. In order to measure the financial development level in China, three 
financial indicators frequently used in the literature are included in the regression 
                                                 
3  Moreover, in stimulating the economic development of the western regions, five focal points are also 
stressed by the central government (i) accelerating infrastructure construction, especially in water 
conservancy, communications, and transportation, travel and broadcasting; (ii) strengthening 
ecological construction and environmental protection; (iii) adjusting the industrial structure, giving 
priority to the industries with comparative advantages and market prospects, while fostering and 
forming new economic growth points; (iv) developing technology, education, and accelerating 
personnel training; and (v) deepening reforms and openness by adopting major policies and measures 
to attract domestic and international investments. 13 
model, i.e. financial depth (DEPTH), bank competition (COMP) and share of private 
credit (PRIVATE).  
DEPTH, defined as the ratio of total loans of the financial institutions to GDP, is 
employed in our regressions to measure the financial depth. In addition, we introduce an 
indicator of bank competition (COMP), measured by the share of credit issued by 
financial institutions other than the four major state banks, to reflect the degree of 
competition in the financial sector. As for the indicator of PRIVATE, we follow King 
and Levine (1993a) to define it as the share of credit allocated to the private sector. 
It is well acknowledged that bank lending in China, especially that of the state-owned 
banks, is heavily influenced by government policy (Lardy 1988). In order to finance the 
government’s policy-lending targets, credit quotas are often unevenly distributed among 
regions without the ability of local deposits in the region: some rapidly growing 
provinces might have a low credit quota and be constrained in their lending volume, 
while banks in the slower growing regions can be assigned high quotas, and have to rely 
heavily on additional funds from the central banks to fill the gap between insufficient 
local deposits and above-quota lending (Boyreau-Debray 2003). Therefore, central bank 
lending to the provinces can be considered as a useful indicator to reflect the degree of 
state intervention in credit allocation. However, data on central bank credits to the 
provinces are unavailable in China. Thus, given the data limitations, we construct here 
the indicator, CENTR, measured as the ratio of financial institutions’ total loans to total 
deposits, as a proxy for central bank lending to provinces.  
Furthermore, the variable of investment rate (INV), measured as the ratio of total fixed 
assets investment to GDP, is also included into our regression model to test the 
conventional hypothesis of investment-induced growth.  
4.2 Regression  model 
In general, for econometric test, the regression model can be described as follows: 
t i i t i t i t i t i u X F Y Y , , 2 , 1 1 , 0 , ε β β β α + + + + + = −  (1) 
In this model, Yi,t is the logarithm of the real GDP per capita in province i at the year t; 
Fi,t is a vector of endogenous variables; and Xi,t is a vector of exogenous variables. The 
inclusion of the lag of the logarithm of real GDP per capita (Yi,t-1) allows us to use the 
information contained in the initial conditions to generate more efficient estimation. In 
addition, this specification also contains an unobservable province-specific effect ui, a 
constant term α and an error term εi,t. Table 3 presents the definitions of variables. 
Descriptive statistics for all these variables can be found in Table 4. Moreover, the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methodology, proposed by Arellano and 14 
Bond (1991) and then further developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), is employed here 
to control for endogeneity in our regression model. 
Table 3 
Definitions of variables  
Variable Definition 
Y  The logarithm of the real GDP per capita 
Financial variables:   
DEPTH 
Financial depth, measured as the ratio of total loans of financial institutions to 
GDP 
PRIVATE 
Share of private credit, measured as the share of credit allocated to private 
sector 
COMP 
Bank competition, measured by the share of credit issued by banks and 
financial institutions other than the four major state-owned banks 
Other control variables:   
INV 
The variable of investment rate (INV), measured by the ratio of total fixed 
assets investment to GDP 
CENTR 
The central bank lending to the provinces, measured as the ratio of total loans 
to total deposits of financial institutions 
 
Table 4 
Description statistics of variables 
 Mean  Std  dev.  Minimum  Maximum  Observations 
Y (in Logarithm)  7.3582  0.6761 6.0217  9.7439  348 
INV 0.3323  0.0970  0.1527  0.7294  348 
CENTR 1.0419  0.2652  0.2357  1.9390  348 
DEPTH 1.0183  0.2992  0.54  2.53  348 
PRIVATE 0.1530  0.0746  0.01  0.35  348 
COMP 0.3256  0.1358 0.01  0.59 348 
Note:   Y = the logarithm of real GDP per capita;  
  INV = the investment rate;  
  CENTR = the central bank lending to the provinces; 
  DEPTH = financial depth; 
  COMP = bank competition; 
  PRIVATE = share of private credit. 
4.3 Data 
Using panel dataset covering 29 Chinese provinces over the period of 1990-2001, we 
investigate the relationship between finance and growth in China. Data used in our 
empirical test are from China Statistical Yearbook (various issues), China Financial 
Yearbook (various issues), Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years 
of China, individual provincial statistical yearbooks and National Bureau of Statistics. 15 
5 Empirical  results 
Based on the methodology of GMM system estimator, empirical results for the coastal 
and inland regions are reported respectively in Tables 5 and 6. For each regression, we 
test our specification of equation with the Sargan test for instrument validity, and then 
with the serial correlation test for the second-order serial correlation. The test results 
suggest that our instruments are valid, and there exists no evidence of second serial 
correlation in our estimations. 
In the case of the coastal regions, all the financial indicators are significant in our 
estimations with the expected signs (Table 5). Empirical results show that financial 
development significantly contributes to the economic growth of the coastal regions. 
Table 5 
Financial development and growth in the coastal regions 
(Dependent variable =  t i Y , : the logarithm of real GDP per capita) 
Generalized method of moments   
Regression I  Regression II  Regression III  Regression IV 
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(2.20) 
t i PRIVATE ,   0.1258* 










       








Sagan test  1.0000  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
AR(2)  0.2465  0.2079 0.3554 0.3148 
Observations  120  120 120 120 
Provinces  12  12 12 12 
Notes:  Y = the logarithm of real GDP per capita; 
  INV = the investment rate;  
  CENTR = the central bank lending to the provinces;  
  DEPTH = financial depth;  
  COMP = bank competition;  
  PRIVATE = share of private credit. 
  *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
  For all regressions, T-statistics values are presented in parentheses. 16 
First, the coefficients of financial depth (DEPTH) are positive and highly significant at 
1 per cent level for regressions I and II, and at 5 per cent level for regression IV. 
Therefore, financial deepening tends to facilitate economic growth in coastal China. 
Second, empirical results also suggest that an increase in the share of credit allocated to 
the private sector (PRIVATE) will enhance economic growth in coastal China. The 
coefficients of PRIVATE are positive and significant at 5 per cent level in 
regressions III and IV, and at 10 per cent level for regression I. This result is consistent 
with the findings in the cross-county studies on finance and growth (e.g., King and 
Levine 1993a; Levine and Zervos 1998). 
Third, a significant and positive impact of bank competition (COMP) on economic 
growth is also reported in our estimations. It indicates that enhancing competition in the 
banking sector for coastal China tends to stimulate economic growth in these regions. 
Moreover, the hypothesis of investment-induced growth always holds for all 
specifications. A highly significant and positive impact of investment (INV) on growth 
is observed in our empirical results. In addition, initial GDP per capita does matter for 
regional growth of the coastal regions. It is significantly and positively correlated with 
the current growth level.  
Furthermore, the indicator of CENTR, the proxy for central bank lending to the 
provinces, is found to be negatively and significantly correlated with economic growth. 
The coefficients of CENTR are negative and significant at the 1 per cent level in all 
regressions. This result indicates that a decline in the level of government intervention 
in credit allocation tends to have a positive effect on economic growth. 
However, for the inland regions, the empirical results show that, except for the variable 
of bank competition (COMP) which still exerts a positive and significant impact on 
economic growth, other financial indicators are all statistically insignificant (Table 6).  
As for the role of investment, the empirical results show that investment (INV) still 
contributes positively and significantly to the growth of inland areas, and can thus be 
considered as the growth engine for both the coastal and inland regions over this period.  
In sum, our empirical results suggest that financial development significantly promotes 
economic growth in coastal regions but not in inland regions; the weak finance-growth 
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t i COMP,     0.1084* 
(2.35) 
0.1187*** 
(2.61)  (2.34) 
       








Sagan test  0.5840  0.5868 0.7496 0.9889 
AR(2)  0.7741  0.4763 0.4011 0.5194 
Observations  170  170 170 170 
Provinces  17  17 17 17 
Note:  See notes to Table 5. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Widening regional disparity in China over the last two decades has generated 
considerable debate concerning the trade-off between efficiency and equity of China’s 
market-oriented economic reforms. By employing provincial data, this paper attempts to 
investigate the relationship between financial development and the growth pattern of 
regional economies in China, and thus contributes to the current debate on the evolving 
patterns of China’s regional income disparity. 
Our empirical results show that financial development significantly promotes economic 
growth in coastal regions but not in inland regions; the weak finance-growth nexus in 
the inland provinces may aggravate China’s regional disparities. These results have 
important implications for the regional development policy of the country. To accelerate 
economic growth in the less-developed provinces and to strengthen the role of financial 
sector in the development process of inland regions, effective policy measures have to 
be set up to improve the efficiency of capital allocation and investments in these areas. 
More detailed research is highly encouraged to provide deeper insights into these 
critical issues. 18 
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